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I.	 SEVERAL FACTORS MAKE INCREASED EFFICIENCY OF WATER USE
(COLLECTIVELY "CONSERVATION"), COMBINED WITH MARKETS FOR
TRADING CONSERVED WATER, AN ATTRACTIVE ALTERNATIVE TO
TRADITIONAL WATER DEVELOPMENT PROJECTS.
A.	 References
1. R. Stay ins,	 Al., madingspAgnyAtimi




Imperial  III1BAIISULDilLtSISI (Environmental
Defense Fund 1983).
2. California Assembly Office of Research, A
lislactills_Appr9ach tsLIIAtsi_lalstatistil (1982).
3. C. Lee, The Transfer stina
(Governor's Commission to Review California Water
Rights Law, 1977).
4. S. Shupe, "Waste in Western Water Law: A Blueprint
for Change," 61 Or. La, 483 (1982).
5. National Water Commission, Water Policies  for _ths
Future 260-70 (Final Report to the President and
the Congress of the united States by the National
Water Commission, 1973).
6. C. Phelps , SI Al., Illingilt_WSISSAIAk_ill
Califorrita: Water Rights, jAter,DiSists arid
Water Trasagis (Rand Corporation 1978).
B.	 Relative cost of conservation is lower.
1. cheap dam sites are gone. E.g., unit cost for
water from proposed Auburn Dam in California (for
storage only) estimated at $300 - $900/acre ft.
2. Some available conservation measures in the
$10 - $15 /acre ft. range, although costs range
higher for more capital-intensive measures such as
concrete lining of canals (estimated at
$180/acre-ft. to line All-American canal in
California's Imperial Valley).
C.	 Lead times for conservation often shorter.
1. Some on-farm conservation measures, such as
improved irrigation scheduling, can begin to yield
savings almost immediately; others may take longer
depending on amount of capital outlay,
construction, etc., but most still are possible in
relatively short time frame.
2. Major construction projects can take 10 years or
more, particularly when adding in planning
and legislative authorization time.
D.	 Environmental considerations favor alternatives.
1. Increased recreational use of free-flowing
rivers, other in-place water uses, and awareness
of need to protect.
2. Becoming increasingly aware of detrimental effects
of past water development on fisheries, other
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public trust values.
E.	 Political climate makes new large projects unlikely,
largely for reasons in B-D above.
1. No new major federal authorizations in last
decade.
2. Fiscal concerns and competition for public
dollar will shift larger share of cost
to water user and discourage new subsidized
large projects.
a. Cost-sharing proposals requiring some form of
up-front investment by state and local
beneficiaries of federal projects.
b. Efforts to revise pricing of federal water
which will increase price (e.g. USSR, LIP
Rate SellingLEo1isy_Yx9w$B1 (April 1984)).
3. Current proposals within Reagan Administration
evidence little chance for new major storage
projects.
4. Same is true at state level in California.
a. Defeat of Peripheral Canal in 1982 and
Governor Deukmejian's through-Delta proposal
in 1984.
b. General legislative recognition that it will
be hard to pass any new major water packages
in the foreseeable future.
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A WIDE RANGE OF MEASURES IS AVAILABLE FOR INCREASING
EFFICIENCIES OF WATER USE AND CREATING NEW SUPPLIES FROM
CONSERVED WATER.
A.	 Largest conservation potential is in the agricultural
sector simply because of amounts of water used.
1. In western states agriculture is by far the
largest user of water; in California this sector
accounts for 85% of water use.
2. Much of new demand likely will arise in the urban
and industrial sectors, encouraging marginal shift
from agricultural savings.
B.	 There is disagreement over potential for real
water savings depending on assumptions concerning
factors such as evaporative losses, reuse of runoff,
percolation to reusable groundwater, contribution of
runoff to other beneficial uses.
1. Potential magnitude of water savings seen in
California's Imperial Valley (discussed infra)
where current estimates for savings range from
350,000 AFY and up. This is equivalent to yield
from major storage project.
2. True potential may not become fully evident until
measures in place to encourage conservation and
create markets.
-4-
C.	 Available measures vary from low cost (generally labor
intensive) to higher cost (generally more capital
intensive); their implementation may vary depending on
economic decisions by the farmer. Some examples
follow:
1. Improved on-farm management: includes
measures like irrigation scheduling (monitoring
crops, weather, soil and other factors, often
combined with computer modeling, to increase
precision of timing and amount of irrigation),
tailwater reuse, and minimized leaching.
2. Improvements in distribution systems: lining
canals, constructing regulating reservoirs, other
structural improvements.
3. Changes in irrigation application methods:
switches to systems which wet smaller areas, such
as drip or trickle. Capital intensive.
4. Crop mix changes: switches to less water
intensive crops.
5. Land fallowing and retirement (temporary or
permanent): proper economic signals may favor
taking land out of production on short-or
long-term basis and marketing water saved.
III. THERE ARE TWO BASIC APPROACHES TO DEVELOPING SOME OF THESE
CONSERVATION POTENTIALS.
A.	 Some commentators have suggested that state courts and
-5
agencies should more aggressively enforce limits on
water use under state constitutional and statutory
prohibitions against waste. Mg., Shupe, 1982).
1. California constitution (Article X, Section 2)
and water code (Water Code Section 100) limit
water right to reasonable and beneficial use;
other western states have similar provisions.
2. Public trust doctrine, recently elaborated on by
California Supreme Court in liatjsivaubjactri
Society v .auperior _Mut, 33 Cal. 3d 419
(1983), requires protection of public-trust
instream uses "whenever feasible;" untested
doctrine which could require alternatives--
including better use of existing supplies.
3. Potential limitations to this approach.
a. Consumes large amounts of judicial or
administrative resources from already
heavily burdened courts and agencies.
1. Recent decision by California State
Water Resources Control Board finding
waste of water by Imperial Irrigation
District (discussed infra) took 4 years
from initial complaint to decision. Now
under judicial review.
2. Diverts agency resources from other
competing tasks (such as toxics
regulation in California).
-6-
b. Subject to political resistance
because seen as interjecting state into
what are perceived as individual and
local decisions on water use, crop mixes,
etc.
c. Approach may be warranted in certain
instances but questionable whether it
can create large scale move toward
conservation, or markets.
B.	 Alternative is creating clear economic incentives to
conservation, including markets in water.
1. The need for water market and potential for
increasing use efficiencies has been noted by
numerous commentators, e.g. Assembly Office of
Research, 1982, and sources cited therein;
National Water Commission, 1973; C. Phelps, gl
Al., 1982.
2. Allowing freer transfer will encourage higher
efficiencies by giving incentives to save water
not necessarily present under current water
pricing practices (e.g., IID to /MD transfer,
infin)
3. Success of markets will depend not only on
economic incentives but on legal and institutional
framework which encourages or discourages
conservation and freer water trading.
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IV. RECENT LEGAL TREND HAS BEEN TO REMOVE IMPEDIMENTS AND CREATE
INCENTIVES TO CONSERVATION AND WATER TRADES. (DISCUSSION
FOCUSES ON CALIFORNIA BUT ISSUES SIMILAR FOR OTHER WESTERN
STATES).
A. In California, appropriative rights to water have long
been recognized to be transferable. Thayer V.
CaliforsdaVADV0Leid,C.P., 164 Cal. 117, 125 (1912);
Age also LtenlkSPILWAtgi DISIList v. Basluner, 36 Cal.
2d 264, 270 (1950). Nevertheless, factors such as
certainty of the right to water being transfered,
protection of current user against forfeiture, and
effects on third parties can act as impediments both to
conservation and to marketing of conserved water.
B. California law now protects user against forfeiture of
right resulting from water conservation or transfer.
1. Former California Water Code Section 1241:
When the person entitled to the use of water
fails to beneficially use all or any part of
the water claimed by him, for which a right
has vested, for the purpose for which it was
appropriated or adjudicated, for a period of
three years, such unused water reverts to the
public and shall be regarded as unappropriated
public water.
The forfeiture period for pre-1914 (non-statutory)
appropriative right is five years. 3111i111 v.
-8-
Hawkins, 110 Cal. 122, 126-27 (1895).
2.	 Recent change protects water rights from
forfeiture when all or any part of water not used
due to conservation efforts (including water
savings resulting from land fallowing or crop
rotation). (Water Code Sections 1010, 1011).
a.	 Water Code Section 1011(a) provides:
When any person entitled to the use of water
under an appropriative right fails to use all
or any part of the water because of water
conservation efforts, any cessation or
reduction in the use of such appropriated
water shall be deemed equivalent to a
reasonable beneficial use of water to the
extent of such cessation or reduction in use.
No forfeiture of the appropriative right to
the water conserved shall occur upon the
lapse of the forfeiture period applicable to
water appropriated pursuant to the Water
Commission Act or this code or the forfeiture
period applicable to water appropriated prior
to December 19, 1914.
C.	 Other recent changes to encourage transfer and protect
right of transferor from forfeiture.
1. AS 1147 (1979) provides procedure for temporary and
long-term transfers of water rights (Cal. Water
-9
Code Section 100.5, 109, Article 1.5 commencing
with section 1210, chapter 10.5 commencing with
Section 1725).
2. A8 3491 (1982) provides comprehensive legislation
protecting rights of those who sell, lease or
exchange water. Also provides, inter altar that
water districts and agencies may act as brokers for
individual users and requires state agencies to
encourage transfers and provide technical
assistance. (Cal. Water Code Sections 109, 380 st
)
a. Water Code Section 109 declares it to be "the
established policy of this state to facilitate
the voluntary transfer of water and water
rights where consistent with the public
welfare of the place of export and the place
of import.
b. Water Code Section 1244 provides:
The sale, lease, exchange, or transfer of
water or water rights, in itself, shall not
constitute evidence of waste or unreasonable
use, unreasonable method of use, or
unreasonable method of diversion and shall not
affect any determination of forfeiture
applicable to water appropriated pursuant to
the Water Commission Act or this code or water
- 10 -
appropriated prior to December 19, 1914.
D.	 Transfers still subject to restrictions on change in
point of diversion, place of use and purpose of use to
protect other legal users and fish and wildlife
(third-party protections.) (Cal. Water Code Sections
386, 1725).
1. State Water Resources Control Board must approve
transfer of post-1914 appropriative right. Must
disapprove any transfer which might injure other
legal users of water involved. (Cal. Water Code
Section 1702).
2. Most often used to protect downstream appropriators
rights to return flow. Fish and wildlife,
recreation and other instream uses dependent
on return flow also of concern. Transfer can
generally only include amounts consumptively used
by present user or additional amounts developed
through conservation.
3. Some have questioned whether junior appropriators
should be protected and advocate removal of such
restrictions, at least for newly acquired rights.
See National Water Commission, Water Policies
for the  iut=g, 263-64 (1973)).
E.	 Other considerations:
1. Inchoate, unquantified rights which may take
priority over right transfered, e.g.'s:
a. Riparian rights (California): right to
reasonable use of water course adjacent to
land; not subject to set quantity.
b. Protection of areas of origin (California):
County of Origin, Watershed Protection and
Delta Protection Acts give priority to
"in-basin" uses, including those not yet
developed, over out of basin transfers
by projects (e.g., Cal. Water Code Sections
10505, 11460, 12201-2).
C. Appropriative rights acquired prior to
statutory procedures (pre-1914) largely
unquantified.
2. Prohibitions on interstate transfers (may be
unconstitutional burden on commerce); see
Eporhass v. RekTipkg, 102 S. Ct. 3456 (1982).
3. Right of water districts to transfer water versus
right of individual landholders within district.
a. Most general district acts in California
provide agency with broad power to sell,
transfer or otherwise convey surplus water,
including to buyers outside district
boundaries. E.g., Cal. Water Code Sections
22225-64; 31020-34; 71610-17.
b. However, individual landowners may not be able
to transfer water assigned to them by district
- 12 -
outside of district boundaries, at least
without district consent. See Cal. Water
Code Section 22251; Jenison v ReAtield, 149
Cal. 500 (1906).
c. California water districts prohibited from
earning profit. (C. Phelps, et al., 1978 at
8). Benefit of net revenues would have to be
distributed to individual members.
F.	 Transfer of water developed by large projects may be
subject to specific restrictions.
1. In California, two major projects, State Water
Project and federal Central Valley Project, provide
approximately 10 MAF combined.
a. Projects hold water rights.
b. Individual users have right under contract
with projects.
2. State water Project contracts permit assignment or
transfer of rights subject to state approval
(Article 41). One concern is financial impact on
project. During drought of 1976-77, Department of
Water Resources encouraged transfers such as
"Metropolitan Exchange" discussed infra.
3. Federal policy potentially more restrictive.
a.	 According to recent Assembly Office of
Research study (1982), USSR Mid-Pacific
Region's transfer policy is:
-13 -
1) Contractors not obligated to take maximum
quantity of water contracted for cannot
purchase water from another contractor.
2) Transfers are permitted between
contractors who are both obligated to
purchase their respective maximum
quantities.
3) Transfers are allowed from districts not
obligated to pay for a maximum amount.
4) If agency outside CVP system wants to
buy, Bureau prefers to deal directly
rather than through contractor.
5) Federal policy requires transfers to be
approved, to occur at cost plus
administration costs, and to comply with
federal excess lands restrictions. (Some
question whether purchasers of federal
water at subsidized prices should be able
to sell water for a profit.)
b.	 Reclamation Law requirement that
project water is appurtenant to land
irrigated may be a further legal impediment
to transfer (43 U.S.C. Section 391 (1902); S.
Clyde, "Legal and Institutional Barriers to
Transfers and Reallocation of Water
Resources," 29 S. DakotA_U 232, 255-6
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(1984)). Specific project authorizations,
particularly authorized service areas, may
also present impediments to transfer.
c. Department of the Interior has stated that
its initial review indicates there would be no
legal restrictions to a transfer of the type
proposed between Imperial Irrigation District
and Metropolitan water District discussed
infra. (Letter from Robert Broadbent,
Assistant Secretary for Water and Science to
Congressman Vic Fazio, August 13, 1984.)
4.	 Significant positive aspect of projects is their
potential to act as brokers and water wheelers.
Extensive distribution systems make transfers
physically easier. Broad place of use provisions
in permits may sometimes ease legal barriers. AB
3491 (1982) discussed supra requires state
agencies, including Department of Water Resources,
to encourage and provide assistance for transfers.
V.	 PAST EXAMPLES OF WATER TRADES
A. During the drought of 1976-77 there were several
attempts to trade water on a temporary basis, some
successful some unsuccessful, as response to short-term
water shortage. (See C. Lee, 1977 at 57-70).
1.	 "The Metropolitan Exchange": Metropolitan Water
District of Southern California ("MWD") reduced its
- 15 -
deliveries from the State Water Project by 400,000
acre-feet by taking additional water from
Colorado. This 400,000 acre-feet was delivered to
nine State Water Project contractors and other
agencies.
	
2.	 Federal Water Banking Program
a. Emergency Drought Act of 1977 directed
Secretary of Interior, through Bureau of
Reclamation to:
assist willing buyers in purchases of
available water supplies from willing
sellers and to redistribute such water to
irrigators based upon priorities to be
determined by the Secretary within the
constraints of State water laws. . . .
(Act of April 7, 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-18,
43 U.S.C.A. Sec. 502 note.)
b. In California, Bureau purchased 46,438
acre-feet of water from seven sellers
primarily along Sacramento River at prices
from $15 to $17 per acre-foot and resold
42,533 acre-feet to buyers in San Joaquin
Valley at $53 per acre foot plus conveyance
costs.
	
3.	 City of Redding transfer
a.	 City water supply purchased from Bureau of
- 16 -
Reclamation Central Valley Project.
b.	 Because of broad place of use provisions in
permits held by Bureau, Redding was able to
transfer to other users within CVP area
without obtaining State Water Resources
Control Board approval.
4.	 Proposed Anderson Farms transfer
a. Anderson farms located upstream from
Sacramento-San Joaquin Delta in Yolo County;
Berrenda Mesa in Kern County which receives
State Water Project deliveries from Delta.
b. Anderson farms proposed increasing groundwater
pumping and foregoing surface water
diversions; State Water Project would then
either reduce storage or increase diversions
from Delta to extent Anderson relied on
groundwater with credit to Berrenda Mesa.
c. State Water Resource Control Board disapproved
transfer as violative of emergency regulations
protecting Delta water quality, potentially
contrary to public interest, and constituting
an unreasonable method of diversion.
B.	 More recently, potential for longer-term exchange of
conserved water from the Imperial Irrigation District
("IID") to ?MD.
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VI. IMPERIAL VALLEY-URBAN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA WATER TRADE
A.	 Physical/technical potential for large savings of water
in IID system with potential for transfer to *ID or
other urban southern California users.
1. IID irrigates some 500,000 acres in Imperial
Valley near Mexican border. Over last decade
diversions from Colorado River have averaged about
275,000 acre-feet/year.
2. 1981 study by California Department of Water
Resources ("DWR") estimated 438,000 acre-feet per
year could be saved through various conservation
measures ranging from on-farm to major system
improvements. (DWR, Investigation—UDAgr
Cal if ornia	 Lit  rt.e ?UDR 275_ pi_ Rae_ sd_ Sistes
lay Iramijs1.1_ 1.1x  i_g a ti on Diarist (19 81 ) ) . This is
roughly amount MWD's actual recent diversions from
Colorado River will potentially be reduced by
Central Arizona Project. Current estimates for
savings in IID system range from 350,000.
3. Irrigation return flows from IID currently
enter Salton Sea (saline sink.) Owners of land
adjacent to sea have initiated legal challenges
alleging rising level of sea caused by waste in
IID system. While Sea currently supports fish,
wildlife and recreation uses, there are no
downstream consumptive uses threatened by
- 18 -
reductions in IID use.
4.	 Since MWD already takes water from Colorado River,
physical conveyance system to accomodate transfer
is in place.
B.	 A water conservation/trade arrangement would have
potential economic benefits both to IID and to ?MD or
other urban user.
1. Detailed analysis by EDF shows that IID would
benefit if MWD were to invest in conservation
improvements by obtaining system improvements IID
may not have incentive to make on its own.
Further benefits would accrue if IID could sell
water for profit. MWD could obtain water at lower
incremental cost than alternatives, including
primarily to expand State Water Project and
increase exports from northern California.
(Stavins, SI Ai. 1983).
2. Preliminary study by Bureau of Reclamation
confirms potential economic benefits. (USBR,
Economic  ApPeudiX So IhSLISIg.Ciai_igoortSWOilitgi
Conservation OoportMitigAg Immaffil Irsiattian
District (Draft, July 1983)).
C.	 State Board Water Rights Decision 1600 (June 1984)
found IID wasting water in violation of state
constitutional and statutory requirements of reasonable
use. (Cal. Constitution Art. X, Sec. 2; Water Code
- 19 -
Section 100). Ordered IID to undertake various
measures to reduce waste, but did not quantify
potential.
1. Decision in response to complaint of landowner
under Water Code Sec. 275 alleging flooding of
property adjacent to Salton Sea caused by waste.
2. Decision finds no legal barriers to transfer;
notes potential for transfer to urban southern
California to meet potential shortfalls from
Central Arizona Project operation.
3. In March 1985, Superior Court found that although
Board had jurisdiction to hold hearing on
reasonableness of IID water use, "[t]he orders
contained in Decision 1600 are without binding
effect on the Imperial Irrigatin District."
Court held Board must initiate separate legal
action under water Code Section 275 challenging
IID's water use. Period to appeal runs to
mid-June.
D.	 Important unresolved legal issue is whether IID can
sell water conserved to any purchaser.
1.	 IID maintains it may sell conserved water to any
buyer for a profit under recent state law
amendments discussed supra (See Water Code
Sections 109, 1011, 1012). District position is
that it holds "present perfected rights" to
- 20 -
Colorado River water obtained under state law and
that these are not superseded by federal "Law of
the River." ((See Arizona v. faliforDIA, 439
U.S. 419, 429 (1979); Bryant v. 1.011S11, 440 U.S.
352, 356 (1980)). Under state law, District
retains right to conserved water and may transfer
to any user.
2. ?WD maintains IID's rights are superseded by
federal law and are subject to Seven Party
agreement allocating Colorado water among
California users. MWD claims right to water not
used by IID under this intra-state agreement.
While MWD is willing to pay costs of conservation
improvements, it claims IID can not transfer water
to another user.
3.	 Resolution could have significant effect on
magnitude of any water savings. Profit incentive
could enhance IID willingness to conserve and
transfer water, especially on longer-term, more
certain basis.
E.	 In March 1985, IID entered historic agreement with
Parsons Corporation, major engineering firm, to assist
in putting together conservation/trade program.
- 21 -
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